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31 August 1949

SUPPLEMENT TO PROPOSED AGENDA FOR FINAL MEETING

- ✓ 6. Decision on how to handle Zog in view of his threat to make public objection to formation of Committee.
- ✓ 7. Action to be taken with respect to 250 Albanians at Bari threatened with deportation to Greece.
- ✓ 8. Action to be taken now that Greek Government has issued statement welcoming formation of Albanian Committee.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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1. The purpose of this paper is to define and clarify the policy for the conduct of OPC operations against Albania during the next year, and to confirm the decision reached at a meeting held in Mr. Burton Berry's office, Department of State, on 23 March 1951. The conclusions set forth below are based on consideration of the re-evaluation of the Albanian problem as presented in the OPC paper of 17 March 1951 (TS 54734), and of the most recent political developments in the Balkan area.

2. The general policy of the U. S. toward the Eastern European Satellites is indicated in NSC 58/2, which defines it in the following terms:

"50. As the most feasible course of action available at this time, the United States should attempt, by methods short of war, to disrupt the Soviet/Satellite relationship and bring about the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of preponderant Soviet power and influence from Eastern Europe."

"54. The United States should do what it can practicably, particularly through covert operations and propaganda, to keep alive the anti-Communist sentiment and hope of those making up the non-Communist majorities in the satellite countries. To do less would be to sacrifice the moral basis of United States leadership of free people."

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3. NSC 103 and 103/1 indicate that the U.S.S.R. is presently capable of instigating a Bulgarian and joint Bulgarian-Albanian attack against Greece, coupled with or in support of a renewal of guerrilla activity. Whether Albania remains nominally neutral because of inability to make an important military contribution or to escape a hostile effort from Yugoslavia, or whether she involves herself actively in the hostilities against Greece, either situation would divert an important Greek military force, and in either event Albania would be likely to serve as an important base for large-scale Communist guerrilla activities. NSC 103 and 103/1 further indicate that in the event of an attack by Communist forces on Greece, it will be U. S. policy to seek by political means to stop the aggression and localize the action; to support anti-Communist guerrilla warfare in Greece or contiguous areas; and to mobilize such military support to Greece as may be deemed appropriate. These measures are to be taken regardless of indirect or direct Soviet participation in the aggression against Greece.

4. Recent diplomatic representations by the Yugoslav Government to the American and British Ambassadors in Belgrade coupled with public statements by responsible members of the Yugoslav Government indicate uneasiness on the part of the Yugoslavs because of the fear that subversive activities conducted by outside interests in Albania against the weak Hoxha Cominform dictatorship might provide the Soviet Government with an excuse for armed intervention in the Balkans, particularly since Soviet propaganda has recently been

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(5. ~~cont.~~) In evaluating the significance of the Yugoslav statements concerning the current activities in Albania, it must be borne in mind that Yugoslavia herself appears to be engaged in subversive activities on a scale fully equal to or exceeding that of the current OPC operations, and that the Yugoslav pronouncements on the subject may, at least in part, be intended to divert the attention from their own actions and lead the Soviets to the view that non-Yugoslav activities are mainly responsible for the unrest within the country.

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accusing Yugoslavia of preparing aggressive plans against Albania and building up a case against the Belgrade Government with the result that the subversive activities in Albania were, in fact, placing Yugoslavia in jeopardy.

6. The policy to be followed in the conduct of OPC activities in Albania must be so developed as to permit the implementation of policy indicated in paragraphs ^{2 and} 3 above, and at the same time prevent the creation of a situation bringing about ^{the} Soviet aggression ~~as is~~ feared by the Yugoslavs.

7. The above-mentioned OPC paper on Albania presented three alternatives for the course of action in the immediate future. These are as follows:

a. Further OPC action with respect to Albania can be abandoned. A decision to do so would result in the loss of U. S.-controlled factors of influence in that country and render it much more difficult to produce results of the kind called for in NSC 103; would be a serious psychological blow to the bulk of the people in Albania, as well as in other Soviet satellite countries and among the anti-Communist refugees and exiled leaders; and would result in some loss of U. S. prestige as the leading element in the world-wide struggle against Soviet tyranny.

b. OPC activities can be maintained at the present level in accordance with the objectives outlined in paragraph 4, above. This level of activity does not permit the development of the potential required to assure an effective means for the exertion of U. S. influence in the area within the present period of crisis. However, it does permit the maintenance of the spirit of resistance and of hope of eventual liberation, as well as continuing the difficulties and discomfort of the present regime.

c. Current OPC activities can be intensified and expanded, and the creation of additional capabilities for future commitment can be begun now. This would

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involve the establishment, under suitable cover, of a pool of several hundred men, which could be committed as required by future political and military developments and in accordance with future policy determinations. As several months will be required for the assembly and training of such a group before it can become an effective asset, preparations should be started well in advance of the date of possible use. The objectives of such preparations might be:

(1) Further weakening of the internal situation in Albania and reducing her aggressive potentialities with respect to Yugoslavia and Greece, as either a direct participant in hostilities or a base for guerrilla activities.

(2) Establishing a firm internal resistance organization comprising effective resistance centers which can be reinforced from the outside through the introduction of trained men in large or small groups with a view to neutralizing the country, or with a view to the creation of a state of underground guerrilla warfare and possibly the overthrow of the pro-Soviet regime at some future date.

(3) Establishing a U. S.-sponsored resistance movement which would be an instrument of U. S.-supported political elements in any political readjustment within Albania resulting from hostilities involving the neighboring countries.

(4) Creating the potential for effective aid to Greece in accordance with the policy set forth in NSC 103, with respect to assistance in the event of aggression against that country through Bulgaria or Bulgaria and Albania.

9 8 It is considered that the last of these recommendations, namely the one contained in paragraph (c) above, represents the one best adapted to the policy specified in NSC 58/2 and NSC 103 and 103/1. It is, therefore, desired that future OPC activities in Albania be conducted in accordance with this policy, providing for an intensification and expansion of current activities to create additional assets, including a pool of several hundred trained men (up to approximately 500 men), who could be committed as required

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by future political and military developments and would represent an organization which can be held in reserve without creating any further disturbance in the Albanian scene until it is desirable to do so. The development of covert resistance nuclei in Albania is to continue in such a manner as to create a minimum amount of disturbance within the country at the present time, and every effort is to be made to prevent violence, sabotage, and clashes with Albanian Government forces, except in defense, until a change of policy is indicated in this respect.

9. Since the activities referred to in the preceding paragraph can be conducted for the next couple of months without any overt manifestation of a change in the tempo of operations, a discussion with the British of the intensification and expansion of activities should be postponed until a later date. For the present, the British will be told that plans for the immediate future provide for the conduct of operations at the current rate, with which they are familiar as a result of direct contact on the working levels, and that we are taking a census of potential assets merely to secure an appraisal of the manpower outside Albania.

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